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[Crim. No. 12350. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1968.] 
In re WILJJIAM Z. CUJ.JVER on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Escape-By Arrestee.-A person who has been arrested for a 
felony and escapes before being taken to a jail or other place 
of confinement is not a "prisoner charged with a felony" 
who "escapes" within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 4532, subd. 
(b), providing among other things that every prisoner charged 
with or convicted of a felony who escapes from the custody 
of any officer in whose lawful custody he is is guilty of a 
felony. 
[2] Id. - 01fense as Statutory. - The legislative history of Pen. 
Code, § 4532, subd. (b), and the related provision of subd. (a), 
indicates that the section applies only to persons incarcera-
ted in jails or other institutions of confinement who escape 
therefrom or such persons who escape from the custody of 
those to whom they haye been entrusted while temporarily 
outside such places of confinement. 
[3] Id.-By Arrestee.-Pen. Code, § 4532, proscribing escapes, does· 
not apply until an arrestee has been booked preparatory to 
incarceration in a jail or other place of confinement and there-
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescu4i, § 2 
et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 6 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Escape and Rescue, § 1; [2] 
Escape and Rescue, § 2. 
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purposc of according to COllSlIllIl'rS who are parties to sucll 
contracts the full protection of the salutary statutc. We must 
particularly avoid the emasculatioll of section 1812.7 by a too 
rcady acceptance of thc cxcuse of a financc company that it 
lacked the "knowledge" rcquired by that section. Accord-
ingly, we hold that thc srdion l'cquires only the holder's 
constructive knowledgc; it docs not sanction any unsupporta-
ble claim of "innocencc. " 
That part of the judgment which provides that the holder 
of the contract is cntitled to collect the time price differential 
accruing after June 2, 1966, is reversed. In all other respects 
the judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs-appellants shall recover 
costs on appeal. 
Traynor, C. J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., 
and Sullivan, J. concurred. 
[Crim. No. 12350. In Bank. Dec. 12, 1968.] 
In re WILTJIAM Z. CUINER on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Escape-By Arrestee.-A person who has been arrested for a 
felony and escapes before being taken to a jail or other place 
of . confinement is not a "prisoner charged with a felony" 
who "escapes" within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 4532, subd. 
(b), providing among other things that every prisoner charged 
with or convicted of a felony who escapes from the custody 
of any officer in whose lawful custody he is is guilty of a 
felony. 
[2] Id. - OBense as Statutory. - The legislative history of Pen. 
Code, § 4532, subd. (b), and the related provision of subd. (a), 
indicates that the section applies only to persons incarcera-
ted in jails or other institutions of confinement who escape 
therefrom or such persons who escape from the custody of 
those to whom they have been entrusted while temporarily 
outside such places of confinement. 
[3] Id.-By Arrestee.-Pcn. Code, § 4532, proscribing escapes, does 
not apply until an arrestee has been booked preparatory to 
incarceration in a jail or other place of confinement and there-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 2 
et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Escape, Prison Breaking, and Rescue, § 6 et seq. 
McX. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Escape and Rescue, § 1; [2] 
Escape .and Rescue, § 2. 
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by becomes a prisoner withiu its meaning. (Disapproving 
People v. Smillie, 55 Cal.App.2d 381 [130 P.2<i 714], People \', 
McConahay, 90 Cal.App.2d 596 [203 P.2d 791], People v. Dar-
nell, 107 Cal.App.2d 541 [237 P.2d 525], People ,'. Segum, 
134 Cal.App.2d 532 [286 P.2d 471], People v. Paul, 147 Cal. 
App.2d 609 [305 P.2d 996], People v. Torres, ]53 Cul.App.2d 
636 [313 P.2d 197], and People v. Valenzuela, 171 Cal.App.2d 
331 [340 P.2d 685] insofar as inconsistent herewith.) 
[4] Id.-From Arresting Officer.-It was not uureasonable for the 
Legislature to conclude that Pen. Code, § 148, proscribing re-
sisting public officers in the discharge of their duties, and 
other statutes that protect officers in the performance of their 
duties, are sufficient to cope with the problem of escapes from 
arresting officers, and thut an arrestee who has not yet been 
incarcerated and who may have done no more than walk away 
from an arresting officer should not be declared guilty of the 
felony of escape. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from cus-
tody. Writ granted. 
Lin B. Densmore for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assist-
ant Attorney General, and Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Deputy 
Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In this habeas corpus proeeeding, peti-
tioner attacks his conviction of violating Penal Code section 
4532, subdivision (b), escape from custody, on the groullfl 
that the undisputed facts establish that the statute did not 
prohibit llis conduct. (See In rc Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 
668 [36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182, 10 A.L.R.3d 840].) 
On the evening of August 11, 1961, a deputy sheriiT 
received a call in llis patrol car stating that a person of peti-
tioner's description had struck another person with a pool 
cue during a poolroom fight and was wanted by the author-
ities. Shortly thereafter the officer saw petitioner runnin~ 
across a field, apprehended him, and placed him under arrest. 
Petitioner struggled with the officer and fled. A t that time no 
charges had been filed against 11im. Within an 110ur petitioner 
was again apprehelHled and taken into custody. At the time of 
the initial arrest the arrt'sting officer had neither an arrest 
warrant nor reason to believe that a crime had been eOlll-
mitted in his presence. He was therefore required, if he was to 
arrest petitioner at all, to arrest him for the commission of a 
1 
) 
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felony. (Pen. Code, § 836.) The felony for which petitioner 
was arrested was assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, 
§ 245.) Subsequently, petitioner was formally chllrw'd with 
battery, a misdemeanol· (Pen. Coue, § 242) und, uftl'I' 11 jUl'Y 
trial, was acquitted. 
Shortly before his acquittal, petitioner was chargeu with 
and convicted of a violation of section 4532, subdivision (b), 
based upon his flight from the arresting officer immediately 
after his arrest. 
[1] At the time of petitioner's escape, section 4532, sub-
division (b), provided that "Every prisoner charged with or 
convicted of a felony . . . who escapes . . . from the custody 
of any officer ... in whose lawful custody he is, is guilty of a 
felony .... "1 The crucial question is whether a person who 
has been arrested for a felony and escapes before being taken 
to a jailor-other place of confinement is a "prisoner charged 
with ... a felony" who "escapes" within the meaning of 
the statute. 
[2] The legislative history of subdivision (b) and the 
related provision of subdivillion (a)2 of section 4532 indicates 
that section 4532 applies only to persons incarcerated in jails 
and other institutions of collfinement who escape therefrom or 
such persons who escape from the custody of those to whom 
they have been entrusted while temporarily outside such 
places of confinement. 
The first escape statute was enacted in 1855 and applied 
only to persons convicted and sentenced to the state prison 
WllO escaped therefrom. (Stats. 1855, ch. 160, p. 203, § 1.) As 
IThe entire subdivi~ion provided: "Every prisoner charged with or 
convicted of a felony who is confined in any county or city jail or prison 
or industrial farm or industrial road camp or who is engaged on any 
county road or other county work or who is in the lawful custody of any 
officcr or person, who escapes or attcmpts to escape from such county or 
eity jail, prison, industrial farm or industria I road camp or from the 
custody of any officcr or person in charge of him while engaged on or 
going to or returning from such county work or from the custody of any 
officer or person in whose lawfnl custody he is, is guilty of a felony and 
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding 10 ycars, 
or in the county jail not exceeding one year; provided, thot when said 
second term of imprisonment is to he served in the county jail it shaH 
commence frum t.hc timc su(·h prisollcr wonld otherwise have been dis· 
(.harged from said jaiL" 
2At thc time herc pel·lincnt, slIl"Jjvisiull (a) provided that "Every 
prisoner formally charged with or convictcd of a mi.~demea?wr .•• who 
Otereafter escapes ... from thc cnstody of allY officer ... in whose 
lawful custody be is, is guilty of a felollY ...• " (Italics added.) Except 
for the italicized words, tire !'!'levllllt text of subdivision (a) is idcntical 
with that of subdivision (b). 
) 
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Nt~ll." ,I/';NUIIIII, IUlII 1II1111t.iull 1117, 11111 11I'11"lllllltltllII' III' til''' I 11111 II,il:', 
IlJJJ,lIllu tu UIIOUlltl. troUl all uUlI!r 1,,·IIIUIIII./l "'/IPUf' Hf'f~I.iIJII" 
appliod ol1ly to pricwJlorH confined in 0. prilJOll who olloapcu or 
attempted to escape from the prison. Indeed, the Code Com-
missioners' notes defined the term "escape" to mean only an 
escape from prison, i,e., as "the deliverance of a person who is 
lawfully imprisoned, out of a prison." (Code Commissioners' 
notes to section 105.) Since the requirement that the prisoner 
be serving a sentence was not included in section 107, that 
section applied to all prisoners in prisons other than state 
prisons whether they had been convicted and sentenced or 
were merely awaiting trial or other disposition. Section 107 
did not apply to a person who had not yet been taken into a 
... prison but who had merely escaped from the custody of an 
arresting officer. Such conduct could be punished, however, 
under section 148 of the Penal Code. (Resisting, delaying, or 
obstructing an officer in the discharge of his duties. See also, 
Stats. 1860, ch. 156, p. ,125, § 1.) 
In 1923 section 107 !Was amended to include" every prisoner 
charged with or convicted of a felony , . . who escapes . . . 
from the lawful custody of any officer." Thus for the first 
time the escape statute contained language that might be con-
strued to apply to an arrestee's llight from the arresting offi-
cer. There are no committee reports setting forth the purpose 
of the 1923 amendment. An examination of the amendment as 
it passed through the Legislature makes it clear, however, that 
the purpose of the amendment was not to enlarge the meaning 
of the word "prisoner" to include persons who had been 
arrested but not yet imprisoned, but to extend the coverage of 
the section to prisoners incarcerated in facilities other than 
prisons or who might be temporarily in custody outside the 
walls of a custodial facility, and to make the offense a felony 
instead of a misdemeanor. 
The bill containing the amendment was entitled" An act to 
3Seetion 105 provided: "Every prisoner confined in the State Prison 
tor a term less than for life, who escapes therefrom is punishable by 
imprisonment in the State Prison tor a term equal in length to the term 
he was serving at the time of such escape." 
Section 106 provided: "Every prisoner confined in the State Prison for 
a term less than for life, who attempts to escape from such prison is 
guilty ot a felony." 
Section 107 provided: "Every prisoner confined in any other prison 
than the State Prison who escapes or attempts to escape therefrom is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, " 
) 
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ameuu s('dioll [107] of the Penal Coue relating to l'seapes and 
attemph'd ('~('apes f!"Om N)Ullty jails, city jails, and f"om the 
custody of the shcriJt while at. work on allY county road." It 
provided: "Every prisoller confined in any jail or prison 
other than the state prison, and every prisoner who is en-
gaged on any county road or otJler county work, who escapes or 
attempts to escape from sudl jailor other prison, or from the 
custody of the sheriff while engaged on or going to or return-
ing from such work is guilty of a felony." (A.B. No. 939, 
introduced Peb. 1, 1923.) The Assembly retained the title but 
amended the text to read: "Every prisoner charged with or 
convicted of a felony who is confined in any jail or prison or 
an inmate of any public training school or reformatory or 
county hospital, or who is engaged on any county work or 
who is in the lawful custody of any officer or person, who 
escapes or attemptc; to escape from such jail, prison, public 
training school, reformatory or county hospital, or from the 
custody of the officer or person in charge of him while 
engaged on or going t.o or returning from such county work or 
from the custody of any officer or person in whose lawful 
cU$tody he is, is guilty of a felony and is punishable as pro-
vided in [section 108]." (A.B. No. 939, as amended April 9, 
1923.) After the Senate made a minor amendment, this bill 
was enacted. (Stats. 1923, ch. 125, p. 270, § 1.) 
Although section 107 as thus amended made clear for the 
first time that any prisoner charged with or convicted of a 
felollY who escaped from the lawful custody of any officer was 
guilty of the offense whet.her or not the escape was from 
witllin a custodial institution, it did 110t enlarge the definition 
of prisoner to include a person who has been arrested but has 
110t yet been incarcerated. Had the IJegislature intended to 
include escapes from arresting officers, it would have been a 
simple matter to amend the section to begin "Every person 
arrested for, charged with or convicted of a felony .... " 
Instead, its placement of the words "lawful custody of any 
officer or person" and its placement of the reference to 
escapes from "the custody of any officer or person in whose 
lawful custody he is" at the conclusion of the other kinds of 
custody and· escapes demonstrates concern with escapes of 
those who had already been incarcerated. It was with respect 
to such persons that the Legislature made clear that all cus-
tody outside the walls of the named custodial institutions was 
included. 
Substantially aU of section 107 was reenacted in 1941 as 
section 4532 of the Penal Code. It is significant that this 
-1 i 
) 
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enactment was one of many undertaken by the Legislature 
pursuant to a 1940 constitutional amendment (Cal. eOllst., 
art. X, § 7) that authorized the Legislature to create a statu-
tory scheme for the management of pl'isons.4 The language 
here involved was transferred to the new section 4532, which 
was included in new title 5 : "Offenses relating to Prisons and 
Prisoners.' '5 Those parts of section 107 that dealt with 
escapes from institutions other than prisons (e.g., reforma-
tories, county hospitals) were left in section 107. Had the 
Legislature intended the language in question to apply to 
mere arrestees, it could easily have left that language in sec-
tion 107 and changed the operative word therein from" pris-
oner" to "person" or placed that language in section 148 or 
in an entirely new section. Since the language in question was 
intended to refer to prisoners in custody while temporarily 
outside the places of their confinement, it was appropriah·ly 
included in the statutory scheme of prison management amI 
control. 
Since 1941 section 4532 has been frequently amended.6 
Only the 1961 amendment, however, which became effective 
after petitioner's asserted escape, sheds any light on the ques-
tion before us, and the cases interpreting earlier versions of 
the statute are not helpful. Although some cases stressed the 
basic statutory purpose of protecting the integrity of prisons 
(In re Haines (1924) 68 Cal.App. 522, 526-527 [229 P. 984] ; 
People v. Mackie (1929) 100 Cal.App. 292, 293 [279 1'. 8211 ; 
People v. Serrano (1932) 123 Cal.App. 339 [11 P.2d 81 J ; see 
In re Haines (1925) 195 Cal. 605 [234 P. 883J)1 others 
assumed that the statute applied at the moment a person was 
4See, R. Kingsley, The Work Of the 1941 Legislature: Criminal Law 
(1941) 15 So.Cal.L.Rev. 31; S. Sefton, Code Sections on State Prisons 
aM County Jails Revised and Codified (1941) 16 State Bar J. 274·27;;. 
GAdded by Stats. 1941, eh. 106, pp. 1083, 1124, § 15. 
6The section was amended in 1943, 1949, 1953, 1955, 1959, 19G1, 1963, 
1965, and 1968. Section 4532 has constantly been before the Legislature. 
Bills to amend this section have been offered in every legi~lative session 
since 1941 with the exception of those in 1951, 1947, and 1945. Thirteen 
amendments (not counting amendments to amellding bills) were offered 
from 1941 to 1961, not one of whieh sought expressly to extend the 
coverage of section 4532 to include the unlawful departure of :m arl'l'stec 
prior to booking and incarceration. 
7In People v, Serrano, sup"a, the court had to ueteJ"lllille wh(,ther a 
person who had been arrested, booked on a charge of "suspieion of 
forgery" and jailed was "charged" within the meaning of section 1 07. 
In holding that he was, the court pointed out that it felt compelled to 
interpret "charged" liberally because the defendant hall "l<'al"ly "cell 
a prisoner who had escaped from a jail and that it was the booking :md 
incarceration that made the section applicable. Thus, the court cmpha-
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
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lawfully arrested. (People v. Smillie (1942) 55 Oal.App.2d 
381 [130 P.2d 714] ; People v. McConahay (1949) 90 Cal.App. 
2d 596 [203 P.2d in1] ; People v. Segura (1955) 134 Cal.App. 
2d 532 [286 P.2d 471] ; People v. Paul (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 
609 [305 P.2d 996] j People v. Valenzuela (1959) 171 Cal. 
App.2d 331 [340 P.2d 685] j see also, People v. Torres (1957) 
152 Cal.App.2d 636 [313 P.2d 197] j People v. Darnell·(1951) 
107 Cal.App.2d 541, 546 [237 P.2d 525].)8 None of the cases, 
however, discussed the question whether a person who had 
been arrested but not yet booked or taken to a jail or prison 
was a prisoner charged with a crime within the meaning of 
section 4532. 
In 1961 the Legislature amended section 4532 by deleting 
the word "formally" from subdivision (a)1I and adding the 
words "arrested and booked for" to both subdivisions (a) 
and (b), s~ that the section now reads "Every prisoner 
arrested and booked for, charged with, or convicted of a [mis-
demeanor (subdivision (a» or felony (subdivision (b»] 
.... " In People v. Redmond (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 852, 861 
[55 Cal.Rptr. 195], the court held that this amendment was 
intended to clarify the meaning of the section and to indicate 
"that the Legislature did not intend the word 'charged' to be 
construed to extend to an arrest without a booking. " 
Although the court mistakenly assumed that both subdivisions 
had theretofore required that the prisoner be "formally 
charged, " its error in this respect does not vitiate its conclu-
sion. [3] We believe the amendment also supports our con-
clusion that the statute does not apply until an arrestee has 
been booked preparatory to incarceration in a jailor other 
place of confinement and thereby becomes a prisoner within 
its meaning. 
By fixing booking as the time at which an arrestee may 
commit a felony by escaping, the Legislature has added preci-
sion to the requirement of incarceration that is implicit in the 
term "prisoner;" The character of preincarceration custody 
sized that the word" prisoner" was the principal operative word in the 
section and that the entry in the jail recorda of the basis for the detention 
was a sufficient" charge" to satisfy the statute. See, ta. at pp. 341, 342. 
IlTo the extent that these cases are inconsistent with our conclusion 
herein, they are disapproved. 
IISee footnote 3, supra. In 1955 the Legislature increaaed the crime 
of escape under subdivision (a) from II. misdemeanor to II. felony. (Stats. 
1955, ch. 585, p. 1079, § 1.) Pursuant to that increaae, the following 
italicized words were added to subdivision (a): "Every prisoner formally 
charged .•. who thereafter escapes .•.. " (Ct. People v. Serrano, 
supra (escape by prisoner booked and incarcerated but not yet formally 
eharged).) . 
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in the field may be fraught with uncertainty and may range 
from a temporary detention for investigation to an arrest for 
an undefined or ill-defined erime to an arrest for a clearly 
specified crime. [4] It was not unreasonable for the Legis-
lature to conclude that section 148 10 of the Penal Code and 
other statutes that protect officers in the performance of their 
duties (see, e.g., Pen. Code, §§ 243, 834a) are sufficient to cope 
with the problem of escapes from arresting officers, and that 
an arrestee who has not yet been incarcerated and who may 
have done no more than walk away from all arresting offieer 
should not be declared guilty of the felony of escape. 
The writ is granted and the petitioner is discharged from 
custody. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., 
concurred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. I would deny the petition for the 
reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Bray in the opmlon pre-
pared by him for the Court of Appcal in In re Culver (Cal. 
App.) 68 Cal.Rptr. 544. 
10The history of section 148 parallels that of section 4532. Stats. 1860, 
ch. 156, p. 125, § 1 declared it to be a crime to resist, obstruct, or oppost! 
an officer attempting to make, or making, an arrest. Section 148 was 
included in the Penal Code of 1872 and its principal language, an ex-
panded version of the 1860 statute, has remained unchanged since: 
"Every person who willfully resists, delays or obstructs a public officer 
in the discharge [of] any duty of his office ..• is punishable .... " 
(Pen. Code, § 148; italics added.) Section 148 applies to one who flees 
from an arresting officer after the arrest has been made. See People v. 
Wilscm (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 738, 743 [37 Cal.Rptr. 42], wherein the 
court held that one who fled from an officer after arrest and then pro· 
cured a gun with which he held the officer at bay had violated section 148 
before he obtained the gun. Wilson was disapproved on other grounds in 
Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 CaI.2d 822, 827 [48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 
409 P.2d 206], but the court in Kellett nonetheless agreed that the flight 
from the officer constituted a separate offense from the procurement and 
threatened use of the gun. See also People v. Derby (1960) 177 Cal. 
App.2d 626 [2 Cal.Rptr. 401] (struggle, flight). Although most cases, 
like the instant case, involve a struggle prior to the flight, thc use of 
force is not an element in the violation of section 148. See In re Bacon 
(1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 34,51·55 [49 CaI.Rptr. 322]. 
